As urban areas across the U.S. grow, open space lands providing wildlife habitat and ecosystem services are lost to development. In response, many communities have experimented with local regulations to encourage land conservation, but little is known about how these policies affect the rate of land use change or housing supply. Wetlands protection bylaws are a potentially important and highly controversial form of local land use regulation in Massachusetts. This paper uses variation in the timing of adoption of these bylaws across communities to analyze their effects on rates of land use change and housing growth from 1971 to 1999. We find that bylaws reduced land conversion to residential uses but did not significantly impact the number of housing units, housing prices, or housing density. Our analysis suggests that the potential supply constraint imposed by bylaws was mitigated by shifts in development sites within communities; we do not find strong evidence for displacement across communities. Attempts to offset reductions in land supply by increasing density within the same jurisdiction may have been hampered by zoning constraints, but it is possible that regional supply constraints encouraged higher density development in the communities where it was allowed. JEL classification: Q24, R14, R31, R52
Introduction
The rapid conversion of open space to developed land uses is a policy issue debated by both environmental and affordable housing advocates.
1 In the U.S., local governments play a key role, as most land use decisions are made at the town, city, or county level. Communities across the country have implemented different policy options for protecting open space, including zoning regulations, land development taxes, impact fees, public land acquisitions, and private land trusts. Although large numbers of communities are in essence experimenting with different local land use policies, it is currently difficult to learn from this experience as there are few systematic evaluations of local policies (see Section 2). Restrictions on land development may protect wildlife habitat and maintain valuable ecosystem services such as water filtration or flood control, but potentially impose high costs by decreasing housing supply and increasing prices or encouraging inefficient leapfrog development patterns. These costs will depend in part on whether regulations are a binding constraint on the amount of new development, or whether they are more likely to alter the location and density of development
In this study, we examine the case of local wetlands protection bylaws, 2 which give towns and cities in Massachusetts the power to regulate land use near wetlands more strictly than the baseline state and federal environmental protection laws. Wetlands bylaws are particularly important and controversial because they are one of the few forms of local regulation that cannot be superseded by a statewide affordable housing law that allows developers to override local zoning if they meet certain criteria. 3 Supporters of bylaws such as the Massachusetts Association of Conservation Commissions have stressed the various environmental benefits of wetlands. 4 The Massachusetts Homebuilders Association, however, points to "local environmental regulations (regarding setbacks, wetlands, and related issues)" as one of the "major factors that limit their ability to permit new homes" (MHBA 2004) .
Our study considers three dimensions of the consequences of this local land use policy for environmental conservation and housing development. First, were wetlands bylaws effective in achieving their primary objective: did they slow development of wetlands or the conversion of undeveloped land to residential uses? Second, did bylaws affect the quantity or price of housing in the communities where they were enacted? And finally, what were the pathways through which bylaws may have changed development patterns? Did bylaws displace development to nearby communities, shift the locations of development within the same community, or induce changes in the density of new housing?
To estimate policy impacts, we take advantage of plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of adoption of wetlands bylaws across communities in eastern and central Massachusetts.
We combine new data at the city/town level on the adoption of wetlands bylaws and other local housing regulations with data on actual land use patterns at three points in time (1971, 1985 and 1999) . Since communities that adopt bylaws might have difference preferences for development than communities that do not adopt bylaws, we control for such potentially confounding factors in two ways: first, with community-level fixed effects and second, with direct measures of variables including other zoning regulations, citizen environmental preferences, geographic determinants and demographic characteristics. To test for potential displacement of development to neighboring communities, we construct a measure of bylaw adoption by each community's nearest neighbors. To test for changes in the location of development within communities, we use GIS analysis to construct variables for the distance from converted lands in each period in each town to the nearest wetlands area, the proportion of converted lands that intersect with wetlands, and the proportion that are within a 100 foot buffer of wetlands areas. In general, we restrict our analysis to communities that still had more than 50 acres of wetlands in 1971, excluding communities with little possibility to develop near wetlands. The magnitudes are robust, however, to including all communities in eastern and central Massachusetts.
We find that each additional year of having a wetlands bylaw is associated with an estimated 7.9-10.1 fewer acres of land converted to residential use. This is approximately 2 percent of the average acreage converted in each 14 year period; or an estimate of more than 10,000 acres total from 1971-1999. However, we find no effect on changes in housing prices and a negative but not statistically significant effect on changes in the number of housing units and the number of new construction permits issued. We also do not find significant effects on the amount of land used per new unit of housing, a proxy for the density of new development.
Our results suggest that wetlands bylaws have indeed slowed conversion of open space lands to residential uses. However, wetlands bylaws do not seem to have resulted in large increases in local housing prices or reductions in housing supply growth. The potential supply constraints posed by land use restrictions appear to have been mitigated partially by shifts in development location within communities. We find that in communities with bylaws, development is more likely to occur on land patches which are further from wetlands and that newly converted lands are less likely to overlap with wetlands. We do not find strong evidence for displacement of land conversion across towns, however: having neighbors with bylaws does not increase land conversion in the home community and has a positive but not statistically significant effect on construction permits. However, we do find that if neighboring communities have bylaws, this increases housing prices in the home community, suggesting possible supply constraints within housing sub-markets in different regions of Massachusetts.
In theory, bylaws could also encourage more dense development, either in the same community or by displacing development to other communities that allow higher density. We do not find significant evidence for increased density within towns due to bylaws. This is not surprising, since zoning regulations are a binding constraint on density in many of these communities, and the amount of land converted to residential use per new housing unit varies considerably within our sample. 5 However, during this period of time, a large share of new construction in the region occurred in already dense areas that had little existing wetlands, as well as less restrictive zoning. 6 To the extent that wetlands bylaws contributed to higher land or housing prices across the entire region, they may have increased the relative profitability of high density development in places where that was permitted by zoning.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews previous research; Section 3 outlines our data sources, trends in land use change in Massachusetts and background on wetlands bylaws. Section 4 outlines our conceptual framework and empirical strategy, Section 5 discusses results, and Section 6 concludes.
Previous research
Local governments in the United States play a significant role in decisions regarding land use change. However, the effects of local land use regulation on land use change have not been studied extensively because of the difficulty of obtaining data at the local level on regulations and land use change. Likewise, few studies in the housing literature have considered the effects of environmental regulations instead of conventional zoning restrictions.
5 Correlation coefficient = 0.328 for amount of land used for new residential housing vs. change in housing units. 6 The 20 communities that were excluded from the study because they were already substantially developed in terms of land use issued more than 35,000 permits for new construction between 1971 and 1999.
Land use regulations and housing supply
The theoretical question of how regulation may affect land values has been explored in a number of papers employing variations on a monocentric city model (see, for example, Capozza and Helsley 1989; Fujita 1982; Wheaton 1982) . In general, the literature finds that growth controls-such as greenbelts or urban growth boundaries-will drive up the value of existing developed land and housing by constraining the supply of additional land for development. Brueckner (1990) and Fischel (1985) argue that the effect of growth controls on the value of undeveloped land might be ambiguous. Controls may delay the receipt of rents or reduce the allowable density of housing and thus profitability of conversion. Mild controls, though, may also raise total potential rents by reducing negative population externalities and requiring high per-unit land consumption, although this may in turn lead to inefficient leapfrog development patterns (Wu and Plantinga 2003) .
Although the magnitudes of the effects differ across studies, most empirical studies of the effects of regulations on prices and rents find that regulation increases prices and reduces the amount of new construction (see, for instance , Fischel 1990; Gyourko 2001, 2002; Green 1999; Malpezzi 1996; Pollakowski and Wachter 1990; Quigley and Raphael 2005; Rosen and Katz 1981) . Studies that specifically estimate the effects of regulations on supply elasticity have concluded that heavily regulated areas have lower levels of new construction and lower supply elasticities than less regulated metropolitan areas (Green, Malpezzi, and Mayo 1999; Levine 1999; Malpezzi and Green 1996; Mayer and Somerville 2000) . Landis, Deng, and Reilly (2002) conclude that some types of local growth control in California do appear to limit population growth but have little effect on the amount of new housing production or housing costs.
Two recent studies have examined the effects of land use regulations on prices and permits in Massachusetts, using the same database of regulations (Local Housing Regulation Database). 
Land Use Patterns and Local Regulation in Massachusetts

Data sources
We compiled data on land use patterns and local regulations in Massachusetts from several sources: the full list of variables and sources are described in detail in Table 1 .
The key source of regulatory data, including information on the adoption of wetlands bylaws, is the Local Housing Regulation Database. This is a recent database on land use regulations in eastern and central Massachusetts that was assembled by the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy and the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston (2005) . 7 In addition to data on wetlands bylaws, the resulting database contains detailed information on zoning practices, including single-and multi-family dimensional requirements, cluster zoning, growth management practices, as well as subdivision rules and septic system regulations. To measure overall stringency of regulations, we created an index for each type of regulation listed above.
More information on the creation of the wetlands stringency index can be found in Appendix A; a detailed methodology of the indices created for other types of regulation is available by request from the authors. The communities included in the database, and thus in our study, are cities and towns roughly within a 50-mile radius of Boston (but not including Boston itself), as shown in 
Regulatory meaning and context
In Massachusetts, decisions to allow new construction are made at the city or town level, in accordance with local zoning bylaws/ordinances and other regulations that govern the development process. All land in Massachusetts is incorporated within city or town boundaries;
there is no regulation of land by county governments.
Massachusetts has a statewide Wetlands Protection Act, originally passed in 1972, that regulates development activities in and near certain types of wetlands.
11 While the state Department of Environmental Protection provides oversight of the law, primary responsibility for implementation is granted to local conservation commissions, volunteer boards of three to seven citizens who are appointed by the board of selectmen or city council. Conservation commissions review applications for development in or near (within 100 feet of) designated wetlands areas and decide whether the proposed development would violate the state's wetlands protection law (Dain 2006) . The commissions may impose conditions on the building project in order to protect wetlands resources. Conservation commissions do have leeway in terms of details, but are bound to uphold minimum protection as specified by the state law (Meyer and Konisky 2005) . 12 In addition to the state law, cities and towns may adopt local wetlands regulations that expand jurisdiction beyond the state minimum. For instance, state law only protects wetlands that border bodies of water, but local bylaws may extend protection to isolated vegetated wetlands or may regulate development in larger buffer zones around the wetlands.
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Communities cannot adopt a bylaw unless it offers additional protection beyond the state law.
10 Conversion from undeveloped uses to commercial or industrial land is generally concentrated in a few communities along major transportation corridors and is substantially restricted by zoning. 11 Specifically, state law protects wetlands that border surface waters (also called "bordering wetlands"), land subject to flooding, riverfront areas, and submerged land. 12 In addition, federal law under the Clean Water Act specifies that any dumping of fill material into wetlands requires a certification from the state that the project would not violate state water quality standards. The major costs of developing in wetlands areas are likely to be the costs of the permitting process. Physically filling and building on wetlands would also create direct costs, but given the large amount of land near Boston that has been filled and built on in the city's history, it seems probable that it would be profitable to fill wetlands if that were allowed. Meyer and Konisky's (2005) review of nearly 600 individual projects found less than 10 percent that involved filling any wetlands. Conservation Commissions can also stipulate that if projects fill in wetlands, these wetlands must be replicated in another location, which adds additional cost. For a study that assesses whether replication policies are environmentally effective, see Brown and Veneman (2001) . 13 Although the contents of local bylaws may vary, there is considerable agreement on a number of provisions. Nearly two-thirds of communities with wetlands bylaws granted buffer zones to vernal pools, almost 90 percent regulated buffer zones around isolated vegetated wetlands. Over three quarters expanded the state's definition of Wetlands bylaws are just one piece of the complex local regulatory framework governing new residential construction in Massachusetts (Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993) . 14 The
Pioneer/Rappaport Initiative on Local Housing Regulation collected data on more than 100 different details of local regulations pertaining to new residential construction. Every city or town has a local zoning bylaw/ordinance that enumerates where different uses and structure types may be built, sets minimum lot sizes and other dimensional requirements, and outlines procedures for obtaining building permits for each use type. Besides zoning bylaws, all but six of the communities in our sample have subdivision regulations that set design standards for road construction in new residential subdivisions, and nearly sixty percent of the cities and towns in our study have rules regulating installation of septic systems. 15 We control for these other forms of regulation both directly and with community-level fixed effects.
Variation in the timing of wetlands bylaws
Local wetlands bylaws or ordinances are adopted if they win a two-thirds vote of approval from either the town meeting or city council. Across our sample, the adoption of wetlands bylaws has proceeded at a fairly even rate from the early 1980s to the recent past, with a small increase in adoptions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The propensity to adopt bylaws is likely to be influenced by characteristics of the community, including residents' preferences for environmental protection, housing market conditions, past history of development, and the prevalence of wetlands. Our estimation strategy seeks to control for these factors, while taking advantage of variation in the timing of adoption.
As Figure 3 shows, there is no clear geographic pattern of adoption of wetlands bylaws: neighboring communities adopted bylaws at different times. Plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the timing of adoption include specific "trigger events," closely contested votes, and statewide events or media attention. "Trigger events" are specific unsightly or poorly implemented projects that can catalyze community action even though they do not necessarily reflect overall rates of conversion. Von Hoffman's (2006) case study of Arlington, "land subject to flooding," created "no-build" zones around wetlands, or allowed the conservation commission to delay certification of wetlands during certain seasons or weather conditions. 14 The regulations discussed here are primarily relevant to residential development; localities also regulate development of commercial and industrial uses, but through different mechanisms, such as parking requirements, restrictions on building height and FAR, and limits on noise, traffic, etc. (outside the scope of this study). 15 This is only a partial list of land use regulations commonly used in the state; for more detailed discussion see Dain (2006) , Glaeser, Schuetz, and Ward (2006) or . 16 We are missing data on the adoption year of nine towns in the sample (see Figure 1) ; these are excluded from the analysis.
Massachusetts found that development restrictions tended to be triggered not by overall levels of new development but by particularly unattractive or otherwise objectionable individual projects.
With respect to wetlands bylaws, an extensive search of local newspapers revealed several events of this nature. For instance, the town of Tewksbury adopted its bylaw in 1991, shortly after the Zoning Board of Appeals ordered town workers to dredge and fill wetlands on a piece of townowned land in clear violation of the state law (Hart 1990 (Hart , 1991 . The town of Brewster "overwhelmingly adopted" a wetlands bylaw giving broader authority over development to the Globe published a three-part series entitled "Losing Our Wetlands." The largest annual adoption rates for wetlands bylaws were between 1987 and 1989, suggesting some adoption in response to this statewide media attention to the environmental importance of wetlands.
Estimating the effects of wetlands bylaws
Conceptual framework
Although shaped by local policies and constraints, most decisions to convert land to residential uses are made by private actors. We therefore work from a theoretical framework based on decisions made by a utility-maximizing individual landowner who faces a choice of whether, how, and when to convert land from one use to another. A landowner is more likely to convert land to an alternate use when the net present value of returns from the current land use is lower than returns from this alternate use plus conversion costs. 17 Similarly, in the case of Massachusetts, we expect that the primary drivers of decisions to convert land from open space to residential use are the relative returns to each use and the costs of permitting and construction.
Wetlands bylaws are expected to slow residential expansion to the extent that they substantially decrease returns to development or increase conversion costs. Conversion costs could be higher because bylaws add time and complexity to the permitting process, make additional lands subject to conservation commission review, or increase the risk of rejection.
Meyer and Konisky (2005) Hardie et al. 2000) , and the existing shares of land in particular use categories at a single point in time (e.g., Miller and Plantinga 1999, Parks and Murray 1994) . 18 When there is no local bylaw, permit applicants or neighbors can make appeals to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and go through the state administrative court system. When a local bylaw is in effect, appeals are made through the Massachusetts Superior Court; these judicial appeals tend to have higher costs for all parties (Meyer and Konisky 2005) . 19 Doss and Taff (1996) find that only scrub-shrub and open-water wetlands increase property values, while much of the Massachusetts wetlands are forested. Mahan et al (2000) find significant but substantively very small (0.003% of median house price) positive impacts of wetlands in Portland, OR. 20 For example Schuetz (2008) finds that local multifamily zoning restrictions significantly decrease permits for new units within the restrictive locality but do not lead to significant rent differences by town.
Empirical specifications
Estimating effects on land conversion and housing development
Drawing on the theoretical framework above, we estimate a reduced form model where conversion of land to residential use is a function of factors affecting returns to development and conversion costs:
In the simplest version of the specification, residential development 21 from time t-1 to t (e.g. !t)
is a function of the number of years that bylaws were in effect during that period (YrsBylaw), a vector of other characteristics (Z) of the community environment affecting the relative utility of conversion, measured at time t, time period fixed effects (! "t ), and jurisdiction-level fixed characteristics (! i ).
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We estimate this function using two strategies. The first takes advantage of the panel structure of the data to include jurisdiction-level fixed effects (Table 3 , columns 1-4). With this strategy, we are essentially identifying effects only from change within jurisdictions over time;
time-invariant factors of each community that are likely to affect timing of adoption and conversion rates, such as geographic location or government structure, are differenced out. In addition, to control for time-varying factors we include measures of several potentially important confounding variables. We include the amount of land in wetlands and the remaining land potentially available for development (that is not protected open space 23 ). These variables are measured at the start of each period (1971, 1985) to avoid endogeneity concerns. To control for local environmental preferences, we include the proportion of "green" voters, based on results from two state environmental referenda near the start of each period and the proportion of the 21 This variable is measured as the number of acres converted to residential land use in each period. We also constructed a version of this variable that subtracts any land that was previously in commercial or industrial uses (relevant only for a few communities). Since the variables are nearly the same, the results are also very similar. We chose to present the more conservative estimates given by using all land converted. These results are also robust to using the percent change in residential land use or the log of acres as dependent variables. 22 This reduced form implies that land use in each time period has not yet reached equilibrium. Many land use models assume that land use in each time period has already reached equilibrium, in which case we would expect changes only where there are changes in the relative returns to land use. Land uses will not necessarily be in equilibrium if the option value of future development is important or if land markets are thin; either would require a threshold of excess rents to be crossed, in which case levels will matter. A recent paper which demonstrates that both levels and changes are important empirical determinants of land use change in the context of expiring Conservation Reserve Program contracts is Roberts and Lubowski (2006) . A similar strategy is also adopted by Carrión-Flores and . 23 We exclude protected land, such as state and federal parks, since this land is only made available for development under unusual circumstances. This is done by intersecting the MassGIS "Open Space" layer (accounting for dates of protection) with the "Landuse" layer.
) ( 1 population that has a bachelor's degree or more (also commonly used as a proxy for permanent income). Other demographics commonly included in housing models to measure housing demand are added as robustness checks (none are significantly correlated with the timing of adoption after adding the controls above): population size, percent of the population that is white non-Hispanic and percent of population under age 18.
The second estimation strategy (Table 3 , columns 5-6) allows us to include fixed characteristics such as distance to Boston that drop out when we include community-level fixed effects. With this strategy we estimate effects using pooled cross-sectional regression (or random effects regressions, results available from the authors). Additional controls include distance to Boston, transportation access, government structure, and other regulatory measures that are likely to be correlated with both the adoption of wetlands bylaws and conversion of open space.
To estimate the effects of wetlands bylaws on housing development, we use similar models to those described above, with measures of housing prices, new housing production and the amount of land used per new housing unit as dependent variables (Table 4) . These provide alternative measures of whether wetlands bylaws have restricted housing supply.
Testing for shifts in location of development
Restrictions on land use in particular locations are likely to result in changes or displacement in the locations of development. There are a number of possible pathways through which such displacement could occur. First, as previously mentioned, restrictions could result in spillovers of development to nearby communities without bylaws. Second, development might shift to different parcels, presumably farther away from wetlands, within the same jurisdiction.
Third, developers may build on the same parcel of land, but alter the siting of individual houses on that parcel.
To explore questions of potential spillover effects across jurisdictions, we include a spatial lag for bylaws in neighboring communities in our basic model (Table 5, 
To test for whether development shifts to new locations farther from wetlands within the same jurisdiction, we use GIS analysis to measure the distance from the centroids of each of the converted patches of land in each of the periods to the nearest wetlands area. We then normalize this measure by dividing by the average distance of land available for development at the start of each period to the nearest wetlands area. If in towns with wetlands bylaws, developers are choosing parcels further away from wetlands out of all the parcels available, then we should expect to see higher values of this ratio where wetlands bylaws have been adopted (Table 5, column 4). Finally, to test for whether there might be changes in the siting within parcels, we measure the distance from the edges of new residential development to wetlands areas. We construct variables measuring the proportion of newly converted parcels that overlap with wetlands (Table 5 , Column 5) or are within 100 feet of a wetland. Table 3 . These confirm the importance of controlling for the broader land use regulatory framework, as the results are similar to the fixed effects models but give a slightly more conservative estimate of a 7.9 acre decrease. Of the regulation measures added, the only significant determinant of decrease in residential land use is more generous cluster zoning regulations (Table 3 , Column 6).
Results
Wetlands bylaws, land conversion and housing development
Cluster zoning provisions allow higher density development in exchange for setting aside a portion of the land as protected open space. In summary, these results suggest a fairly modest impact of wetlands bylaws on the conversion of land to residential uses. Summed across the number of years that community bylaws were in effect across the two time periods (for the 158 communities), this equals approximately 10,710 acres protected, compared to 168,039 acres converted in those communities.
We do not find statistically significant impacts of wetlands bylaws on several measures of housing supply and density (Table 4) We might expect systematic sources of heterogeneity in the effects of bylaws.
Communities with larger amounts of wetlands might have stronger preferences for protection (or conversely, less concern about losing a more abundant resource). However, the interaction between years of bylaws and land in wetlands is not significant (Table 3 ; Column 4) or large in magnitude. We also might expect stronger effects in communities with more stringent wetlands regulations. To test this we use an index based on detailed information about various provisions in the bylaws (see Appendix A).
24 Again, we do not find significant differences for communities A potential concern with our results is the possibility that communities are adopting wetlands bylaws in response to high rates of land conversion. We might expect to see communities adopt bylaws just after a period of rapid development. To test whether adoption of bylaws follow a spike in development, we compare the number of permits granted in the calendar year prior to the year of adoption to average annual permits granted over several longer 24 Unfortunately data on the details of bylaw contents are available only for 2004.
periods prior to adoption. 25 We do not find evidence that adoption of bylaws follows a sudden increase in development. The numbers of permits granted in the year prior to adoption are statistically indistinguishable from the average annual permits over the preceding three, five, and ten-year periods (Table 6 ). If however, it is still the case that higher levels of development in the early part of one of the periods do significantly influence the timing of adoption, this will bias our estimates towards zero (making it less likely that we would see an effect on land conversion rates). Ideally, we would have instruments for wetlands bylaws, but unfortunately we do not have convincing instrumental variables in this case. Given the situation described above, however, our results can be interpreted as a lower bound on the effectiveness of bylaws in slowing conversion.
Changes in the location of development
As discussed in Section 4, it is quite possible that wetlands bylaws do not constrain the level of residential development so much as alter the location, either across or within jurisdictions. In Table 5 , we show the results of several tests for different types of displacement.
In the models shown in Columns 1-3, we include a measure of the number of years neighboring The final models shown in Table 5 test for possible evidence of shifts in location within rather than across jurisdictions. There is a positive, marginally significant relationship between wetlands bylaws and the normalized distance from the centers of newly converted patches of land to nearest wetlands (Table 5 , Column 4). This suggests that wetlands bylaws result in conversion of land that tends to be further away from wetlands. This is consistent with (although not conclusive proof of), some displacement of development to parcels where development would not be hindered by wetlands bylaws. In addition, we find (Table 5 , column 5) that there is a significant decrease in the proportion of new conversion that has edges that overlap with wetlands. 26 This is also consistent with small shifts in development away from wetlands areas, possibly within the same parcels. These results are consistent with the case study findings from Meyer and Konisky (2003) , suggesting that wetlands bylaws alter the location of new development within parcels.
Conclusion
The evaluation of local strategies to protect open space has been limited because of the difficulty of obtaining data on both policy tools and land use patterns at the community level.
This study adds to our understanding of how local regulation affects land use patterns and another, there may be scope for a tradable development rights system that would work across communities. Such policy solutions will also depend on increased understanding of how ecological benefits vary with different patterns of housing (e.g. Lenth et al. 2006 , Pejchar et al. 2007 across site and community level landscape scales. Acres of land converted to residential development Mass GIS Landuse (1971, 1985, 1999) 532 428
Change in housing values
Change in median housing price, inflation adjusted 70154 40698
Change in hsg. units Change in number of housing units 1208 1307 Land used / new hsg Residential dev. / new housing units U.S. Census (1970 Census ( , 1980 Census ( , 1990 Census ( , 2000 0.647 0.496 Housing permits Number of housing permits issued (1971-85, 1985- Columns 1 and 2 show the mean and standard error (in parentheses) of housing permits issued. Column 3 shows the difference in means and t-statistics from two-tailed t-tests for difference in means between columns 1 and 2. T-tests exclude communities for which permit data are not available for the full period. Communities have a number of different specific tools by which they can expand the regulation of wetlands beyond protections offered by the state law; the more tools used in a bylaw, the more restrictive that bylaw will be. Thus to capture the overall stringency of each bylaw, we create an index that sums the number of components by which the bylaw exceeds state regulations. Results of principal components analysis suggest that each component should be given roughly equal weight in this index, so for simplicity of interpretation we created unweighted indices, standardizing individual variables (set to mean zero and variance one) before summing them. The index ranges from zero to sixteen, with zero indicating the lowest possible level of stringency.
WETINDEX = VERNAL + VERNWIDE + NEWBUFF + LSF + NOBUILD + DELAY
VERNAL is a measure of local regulation of vernal pools. Values range from 0 to 3, indicating the number of ways in which the bylaw expands the regulated jurisdiction around vernal pools beyond the state's standards: (1) listing vernal pools as a resource area, (2) regulating a buffer zone around vernal pools, or (3) defining the pool's "habitat" as part of the resource area. VERNWIDE is the width (in feet) of buffer zones around vernal pools.
NEWBUFF is a categorical variable increasing in stringency, indicating whether the bylaw regulates buffer zones around isolated vegetated wetlands. LSF is a measure counting the number of ways in which the bylaw expands regulation over land subject to flooding: (1) adding terms to "land subject to flooding"; (2) extending a buffer zone around land subject to flooding; or (3) expanding the definition of land subject to flooding beyond state's definition (i.e.
shallower depth or smaller volume). NOBUILD is a continuous variable indicating whether the jurisdiction creates "no building" or "no disturbance" zones that limits the type or amount development activities near wetlands, and if so, the width (in feet) of the no-build zone. DELAY is a dummy variable that indicates whether the bylaw gives the Conservation Commission the right to delay certification of wetlands during certain times of the year or weather conditions.
